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Following the 2016 US presidential election, there has
been an increased focus on politically-motivated manipula-
tion of mass-user behavior on social media platforms. Since
a large volume of political discussion occurs on these plat-
forms, identifying malicious activity and coordinated cam-
paigns is essential to ensuring a robust democratic environ-
ment. Twitter has become a critical communication chan-
nel for politicians and other public figures, enabling them to
maintain a direct relationship with supporters. However, the
platform has been fertile ground for large-scale malicious
activity. As the 2020 U.S. presidential election approaches,
we have developed tools to monitor follower dynamics of
some of the most prominent Twitter users, including U.S.
presidential candidates. We investigate numerous, strange
phenomena, such as dramatic spike and saw-tooth wave-
forms on follower-count charts; cohorts of user accounts
which ‘circulate’, i.e., re-follow high profile accounts numer-
ous times; and other ‘resurrected’ accounts, which have re-
cently re-engaged on Twitter after years of non-activity. So
through various analyses in these contexts, we reveal mul-
tiple, coordinated ‘social’ targeting campaigns aimed at af-
fecting the outcomes of socially critical events through the
use of networks of social automations (bots), often opti-
mizing their social capital through ‘compromised’ accounts,
which have—unbeknownst to the greater world—been hi-
jacked.
1 Introduction
The notion of “social bots,” socio-technical systems de-
signed to interface with social media platforms and interact
with humans, is not a new one. However, as systems become
more advanced, there is increased need for tools that can au-
tomatically detect these automatons as they can have very
real impacts on society in the form of manipulating democra-
cies, inciting panic during emergencies, and influencing ma-
jor stock markets [1].
While a lone automaton might have a marginal effect
on a social media platform, there is danger in coordinated
bot accounts (bot networks or botnets), particularly if those
networks are heavily embedded in public discourse. For ex-
ample, a covert botnet deeply embedded in public discourse
could be well positioned to direct and propagate misinfor-
mation [2]. In order to prevent such situations, it becomes
increasingly important to develop tools so that, at the very
least, humans and bots are able to recognize one another as
they interact online.
Several works have pursued the study and identification
of botnets on social media. Per the taxonomy introduced
in [1], typical approaches follow network-based [3, 4, 5, 6],
crowd sourcing [7], or feature-based [8,9,10] methods. Fully
coordinated botnets have previously been found, like that of
the discovery of the ‘Star Wars’ Twitter botnet [11], which
demonstrated the existence and behavior patterns of system-
atically created bot accounts. Additionally, it is known that
bot accounts are bought and sold in dark markets, presenting
interesting insights into how bot accounts occasionally trade
hands during their lifetimes [12].
By monitoring statistics about users’ accounts on Twit-
ter, we have identified preliminary evidence which appear
to exhibit systematic and coordinated manipulation of fol-
lower counts. This includes behavior that appears to “buff”
(enhance) or “nerf” (diminish) the follower growth of ac-
counts through superposition of both sharp, sub-second,
delta-function spikes and longer ranging, sawtooth waves.
We are presently engaged in investigating these phe-
nomena further and the hypothesis that we are witnessing
“botnets” in action—realized as weaponized collections of
user accounts, with activity designed to either help or hurt
specific individuals’ statuses on the Twitter platform. Net-
work approaches have been demonstrated on a case-by-case
basis to be effective in identifying coordinated accounts in a
recent study [13]. We can construct and analyze the relation-
ships between groups of suspicious accounts by sampling
follower lists, subsequently identifying discrete and possibly
interconnected botnets.
Our observations lead us to ask about the objectives of
any potentially implicated botnet’s actions. At a high level,
impacts must directly target human perceptions of these
accounts, or some automated aspect of Twitter’s platform,
which thus might indirectly target these perceptions. How-
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Fig. 1: Follower counts of Elon Musk and Donald Trump demonstrating spike and sawtooth patterns over the course of 12 hours.
Table 1: Observed spike and sawtooth characteristics.
Username Followers (millions) Spikes/Day Avg. Spike Effect Net Spike Effect Sawteeth/Day Avg. Sawtooth Effect Net Sawtooth Effect
Presidential Candidates
realDonaldTrump 75.73 608 7,422 481,740,537 25 -7,907 -22,915,819
BernieSanders 11.41 411 98 3,044,831 147 -361 -5,699,337
JoeBiden 4.70 361 -70 -2,511,603 48 -123 -650,322
amyklobuchar 1.01 108 -38 -392,359 12 -28 -67,696
GovBillWeld 0.09 46 -18 -43,303 11 -113 -479,920
Individuals
elonmusk 32.63 574 -924 -58,088,500 32 -1,053 -3,205,884
Cristiano 83.51 527 -1,156 -63,668,866 25 -1,460 -3,229,595
ArianaGrande 72.29 526 -456 -26,673,829 39 -1,619 -4,826,954
narendramodi 54.63 506 -4,679 -95,641,313 26 -5,434 -8,564,685
justinbieber 110.71 492 -144 -8,839,477 47 -2,032 -7,782,180
Organizations
NASA 35.91 505 -387 -22,288,451 38 -806 -4,123,770
WhiteHouse 21.12 502 -253 -13,426,879 25 -512 -1,385,918
BBCBreaking 42.37 493 -564 -29,563,485 21 -861 -1,871,289
CNN 46.43 459 -1,037 -16,622,269 42 -1,217 -2,341,954
nytimes 45.83 449 -13 1,183,160 39 -746 -3,399,156
ever, given the short-range timescales of our observations,
we focus on the hypothesis that the intended direct targets are
Twitter’s platform, particularly its user-search ranking utility
as well as the recommender system for suggested accounts
to follow.
2 Experiments
Largely, this work falls under the umbrella of the emerg-
ing sub-field of machine behavior [2]. Operating under the
hypothesis that these observations indicate coordinated ac-
tion, potentially due to activities of automata, this work de-
scribes several on-going experiments to better understand the
phenomena observed. This work is primarily concerned with
the generative mechanisms behind theses phenomena, and
thus these experiments are designed to serve as a basis to
reason about such mechanisms as well as their functions.
2.1 Coordinated (Un-)Following (E1)
Initially, this work began in an attempt to measure mi-
crodynamics of Twitter-user interest in the political candi-
dates participating in debate discourse. To observe this phe-
nomena, a watchlist of 2020 U.S. Presidential election candi-
dates’ Twitter accounts was constructed to monitor through
Twitter’s API. Having observed striking features in these
high-resolution, temporal data (shown in Fig. 1), the watch-
list was maximally extended (on a free-tier set of Twitter API
credentials) to encompass a breadth of high-profile accounts
that are known to contribute to political discourse or other-
wise have grown exceptional social followings on the plat-
form.
2.1.1 Methods
To observe changes in high profile accounts, a cycling
script was created to monitor shifts in user profiles, e.g., fol-
lowers or friends. Due to API rate limitations, this script
samples users approximately once per second.
2.1.2 Observations
Mass-following/un-following events: Monitoring user
watchlists exposes surprising dynamics on high-profile ac-
counts. Fig. 1, exhibits follower-count data in raw form for
two prominent users (@realDonaldTrump and @elonmusk).
These line charts exhibit the numbers of each users’ follow-
ers at a 1-second sampling rate. In particular, Fig. 1 illus-
trates two elementary shapes:
Spikes: Sharp follower count increases and decreases
that immediately disappear, i.e. the follower count re-
turns to the pre-spike level.
Sawteeth: Sharp follower count decreases that do not
return the follower count to previous levels, i.e. a more
permanent change compared to spikes.
Repeated occurrences of both of these patterns strongly
suggest automated behavior, since organic follower growth
or loss is unlikely to occur in such a discrete manner. For a
broader cross-section of high profile users, Table 1 character-
izes the quantity, size, and computed effect to users grouped
by broad account types.
This high sampling rate casts question—is it possible the
spikes and saw-tooth features are algorithmic in nature? Or,
perhaps this is a platform side-effect caused by Twitter mass-
deletions, as has been suggested in the context of deleted
tweets, likes, re-tweets, and comments [14]. Unfortunately,
the 1-second sampling rate was the limit of our standard-
API capacity for resolution. All initial attempts to further
resolve these spike and saw features by refining the sampling
rate appeared to have no effect on our ability to observe any
smoothness, imploring further investigation.
2.2 Circulating Accounts (E2)
Operating under the assumption that the majority of ef-
fects of the patterns observed in E1 are inorganic, one or
more automated network or networks of Twitter accounts
in the 106 scale, at least, must exist. These groups of ac-
counts must also be exhibiting a specific type of behavior:
repeatedly following and un-following high-profile accounts.
These circulating accounts are key to understanding the phe-
nomena of spikes and sawteeth.
2.2.1 Methods
A cycling download of the most recent 10,000 followers
for each tracked account was initiated and maintained. API
rate limitations resulted in an approximately 3-hour period
between downloads for each user.
Table 2: Observed circulation characteristics.
Username Circulating Followers Circulations Circulations/Day
Presidential Candidates
realDonaldTrump 574,617 588,517 5,350
BernieSanders 1,725,767 4,938,692 44,897
JoeBiden 1,393,163 4,673,670 42,487
amyklobuchar 239,093 3,917,608 35,614
GovBillWeld 13,496 2,358,950 21,641
Individuals
elonmusk 1,962,410 2,732,585 24,841
Cristiano 2,460,784 3,905,542 35,504
ArianaGrande 1,757,980 1,968,667 17,896
narendramodi 1,381,224 2,653,892 24,126
justinbieber 2,223,687 2,855,490 25,959
Organizations
NASA 2,263,533 4,423,285 40,211
WhiteHouse 2,118,902 3,966,168 36,056
BBCBreaking 2,218,925 4,469,857 40,635
CNN 2,136,211 3,233,881 29,398
nytimes 2,087,851 4,673,142 42,483
2.2.2 Observations
Limitations of Sampling: For many accounts, the num-
ber of circulating followers found were in the 106 range, as
shown in Table 2. Critically, when follower growth rates are
so high that significantly more followers than 10,000 are ac-
quired within the 3-hour window, this method fails to cap-
ture the most recent, short-period circulation activity. The
much lower-than-expected circulation numbers for @real-
DonaldTrump are potentially a result of this limitation.
Spikes, Saws, & Circulations: Figure 3 plots ob-
served circulation events against observed spike and saw ef-
fects, demonstrating through correlation a seemingly (con-
cave down) functional relationship between the two. Thus,
these two entirely-separately measured effects are related.
The non-monotonic behavior exhibited here can potentially
be interpreted as follows: for accounts with high spike and
saw effects, capturing all circulations becomes a challenge
(because of rapid burying rates). This is evidenced by the
under-estimation which gets ‘worse’ as a falling trend in
figure 3. At the other end, non-zero veracity in the order-
ing of follower lists (by follow time) ‘bakes in’ some over-
estimation for all, but is only observable for small spike-saw
effect accounts who generally receive too-few new follow-
ers to drown out this relatively marginal (by orders of mag-
nitude) over-estimation. @realDonaldTrump is the extreme
outlier at bottom right.
Figure 2 illustrates observed circulation activity on the
Fig. 2: Circulation activity on @JoeBiden and @BernieSanders. Gap between 4/26-4/30 is due to data loss.
final two Democratic candidates’ accounts. Despite having
half the followers of @BernieSanders, circulation activity on
@JoeBiden often matched or exceeded @BernieSanders’.
Inspecting follower lists revealed a further unexpected
phenomenon: the abnormal abundance of “ancient” Twitter
accounts among recent followers, especially among recent
followers of @realDonaldTrump.
2.3 Ancient Accounts (E3)
When analyzing follower samples of high-profile ac-
counts (see E2), a surprising proportion of the samples were
of older accounts. When a Twitter users creates an account,
they are assigned a unique user id (UID). UIDs have a vari-
able number of digits, currently ranging from 2 to 19 digits,
that corresponds to when an account was created. Older ac-
counts have smaller UIDs (and thus fewer digits), whereas
an account created in July 2020 will have been assigned a
19-digit UID.
Accounts with 8-or-fewer digit UIDs correspond to ac-
counts created on or before December 2009. The fact that
we are sampling follower lists of high-profile accounts—
accounts that already have significant followings—it is sur-
prising that a number of “ancient accounts” would appear at
the top of these samples, thus indicating a recent following
time. This has lead us to question why these “ancient ac-
counts” are so active in recent follower samples, and what
general dynamics Twitter’s oldest users exhibit.
2.3.1 Methods
In order to better understand and characterize the behav-
iors and dynamics of ancient accounts, a list is maintained
of all ancient accounts encountered during E2’s samples.
Through another sampling script, these ancient accounts are
cycled over, monitoring their user timelines.
2.3.2 Observations
Magnitude of Occurrence Since beginning observa-
tion, around 2 million unique ancient accounts have appeared
in the most recent 10,000 follower samples from E2. By our
estimates, this is at least 2% of all of Twitter that was created
prior to December 2009, and is around 6.5% of the monthly
active users (MAUs) present on the platform in 20101.
Large Gaps in Timelines To better understand the na-
ture of the ancient accounts observed, timelines are currently
1 https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/
number-of-monthly-active-twitter-users/, accessed
August 4th, 2020.
monitored for all accounts with 7 or fewer digits and all 8-
digit accounts following @realDonaldTrump (by-and-large
one of the most dynamic user followings, as seen in E2). Of
those with tweet gaps≥ a year, many appear to have recently
“re-awoken” as seen in Fig. 4.
We are compelled to ask: why did so many of these
accounts recently end their multi-year gaps in their time-
lines? Could it be a side-effect of real-world events, per-
haps of the progressing U.S. presidential primaries or the
start of COVID-19 lockdown procedures? Are these num-
bers inorganically inflated through activated automata? It has
previously been shown that some merchants that sell Twit-
ter accounts create and hold these accounts prior to sale—
sometimes upto a year even—giving accounts more credibil-
ity simply because they have been around on the platform
longer [12].
Fig. 3: As the total spike and saw effect increases beyond a critical
point near 15,000,000, more circulation effects presumably escape
detection. 39 low-effect accounts with positive correlation and 58
high-effect accounts with negative correlation are seen.
Fig. 4: (Left) Histogram of end dates of tweet deltas that are longer than a year. A large number have recently started tweeting again,
aligning with early US lockdown procedures and reaching a peak during 3/21-3/23. (Right) Regardless of start date, there is a strong linear
correlation between length of gap and its end date due to the effects of many accounts beginning new tweet behaviors.
2.4 High-Profile Tunneling (E4)
In light of the surprising dynamics observed in follower
lists (see E2 & E3), a series of experiments were constructed
to characterize what a full follower list looks like for high-
profile users.
2.4.1 Methods
A recursive sampling script was constructed to “tunnel”
out each follower list on our watchlist. After this process,
the UIDs were gathered and hydrated into full user objects to
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Fig. 5: A fully hydrated visualization of @BarackObama’s follower
list, when users are grouped by digits in UID. The surprisingly in-
verted sub-region is magnified to better demonstrate the inversion
of digit proportions.
gain more user-specific information (e.g. privacy or verifica-
tion status).
2.4.2 Observations
Tunnel Dynamics: Full follower lists paint an interest-
ing portrait of the history of an account—much like rock
strata in an excavation. In Fig. 5 we present what @Barack-
Obama’s follower list looks like when followers are grouped
based on the digits in their UID. By grouping followers based
on a given property, one can ask questions about dispropor-
tionately concentrated cohorts of users. For us, the number
of digits in a UID coarsely approximates the account’s cre-
ation date.
For example, Fig. 5 shows an odd region of @Barack-
Obama’s following list. In a region dominated by 18-digit ac-
count creation, the dynamics briefly invert deep mid-region,
with 9- and 10-digit users becoming the dominating groups.
This continues for about 500 batches of 5,000 followers
(around 2.5 million followers), before returning back to the
average 18-digit ratio between 0.6 and 0.8.
Here we are compelled to ask: what happened to
@BarackObama’s followers that caused a mass exodus of
18-digit accounts? Or did an abnormally high number of
older accounts follow @BarackObama during this window?
One could imagine scenarios where such an occurrence is, in
fact, inorganic in nature. Perhaps a network of bot accounts
embed themselves deeply on a user account’s following, for
use at a later date—say, to spike back on the account or to
influence long term saw-waveforms. So while we have not
experimentally qualified this though any temporal, follow-
ing/unfollowing associations, such a reservoir is consistent
with the observation of sawteeth. Further experimentation
is needed to better refine which hypotheses are more likely,
and whether or not this observation is organic or inorganic in
nature.
3 Discussion and Open Questions
The experiments detailed in this work are a part of a
larger set of diagnostic tools actively being developed to
identify anomalous and coordinated behaviors on Twitter,
with an emphasis on uncovering behaviors that may be tar-
geting high-profile, and often political, users.
Many of theses behaviors are odd. Sub-second spikes
and saw-tooth follower distortions, disproportionate group-
ings of accounts on high-profile users, and seemingly ancient
accounts that have “re-awoken” after years of inactivity are
a subset of these behaviors that this work highlights to raise
awareness as we gather additional observations to better dis-
ambiguate the how and the why of the behaviors recorded.
Here, we highlight some of the open questions we are
actively considering:
1. How can we utilize network-based methods to fur-
ther pin down coordination? Previous methods have
shown success in both network-based and feature-based
approaches, as highlighted above. Through both friend
and follower list connections, as well as the lesser
known, general Twitter list connections, we seek to in-
vestigate how we may apply and develop new, similar
methodologies to highlight coordination.
2. What is the underlying mechanism behind the be-
haviors observed, particularly the spike and saw-
tooth behaviors? Through both E1 and E2, there is
strong evidence that some of this behavior is a result of
circulating accounts. However, the exact mechanism as
well as the underlying intent of this phenomenon is still
an open question.
3. How do these behaviors—particularly if inorganic—
shape public discourse on Twitter and what effect do
such behaviors have on international democracies?
Questions on how algorithms affect public discourse and
democracy are not new [1, 2], and this work is very in-
terested in providing more insights into this question.
In particular, we seek to engage in semantic analyses
at-scale to better characterize the “chatter” suspicious
accounts are engaged in, especially with the U.S. 2020
presidential election looming on the horizon.
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